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Abstract
The private insurance industry is susceptible to increasing risk from climate change and can
serve as a catalyst to change behavior to minimize loss. The research examined the current
impact and future potential of the insurance industry to reduce both physical and financial risk.
The insurance industry currently raises awareness, assigns an economic value to risk, advocates
for climate change action, and takes measures to reduce physical risk through mitigation. As
well, the industry has proven to be a critical influencer to encourage risk-adverse behavior and
regulation. Recommendations to the industry to have a greater impact include: 1) pursue more
private/public partnerships, 2) make risk-prediction models more accurate and more accessible,
3) expand investments in green bonds and similar impact investments, and 4) increase disaster
risk reduction services. These recommendations emphasize the importance of collaboration with
non-profits organizations, governments, the scientific community, and industry peers. Private
and public entities should continue to partner with and encourage the industry to pursue
innovative solutions to reduce the financial and physical risks related to climate change.
Keywords: insurance industry, climate change, mitigation
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INTRODUCTION
Recent weather disasters have highlighted the potential of the natural environment to
impact society and the economy. This is especially true in North America, where 74% of total
global economic losses from weather-related events occurred in 2012 (Swiss Re, 2013a).
Damages from Hurricane Sandy in 2012 alone resulted in an estimated 147 direct deaths and
over 50 billion USD in losses (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (2013) predicts future weather events to occur at similar or greater
frequency and magnitude as the effects of climate change, primarily increasing sea temperature,
continue. Simultaneously, increasing global economic development is likely to put more people
and greater value in the path of such destructive weather, resulting in greater potential
devastation.
The effort to reduce such losses and ensure societies are better prepared needs to match
the scale of potential damage. This will require input and collaboration from the government,
non-profits, and private sectors. One private industry is especially susceptible to increasing risk
from climate change and can serve as a catalyst to change behavior to reduce risk—the insurance
industry.
The insurance industry is in the business of sharing financial risk to reduce the impact of
devastation from hazards, and potentially has much to lose given increasing risks from climate
change. The insurance industry currently is responsible for approximately 40% of catastrophe
economic losses in industrialized countries (Hoeppe and Gurenko, 2006). The private insurance
market takes on trillions of dollars of insurance risk annually (Geneva Association, 2013a). The
industry is regarded as “an important part of society's climate observing system, integrators of
the costs of weather-related hazards, and messengers of the implications through their pricing
and terms. It also can be an agent of preparedness and recovery, essentially a component of
society's adaptive capacity” (Mills, 2009).
The role of the insurance industry in disaster risk sharing and reduction is gaining
recognition because of recent major disasters (Swiss Re, 2013c). Such visibility represents an
opportunity for the industry to raise awareness of risk and possibly influence the behavior of
policyholders and other society members to reduce risk. Such reductions may benefit society, but
are ultimately motivated by business decisions to maximize profit. Climate risks impact nearly
5

all lines of insurance and as such, reducing risk through mitigation behavior can make losses
more manageable (Mills, 2007). In the case of the insurance industry, what is good for the
bottom line can also be good for the environment and society.
The insurance industry already increases awareness of risk and incentivizes mitigation
and adaptation through policy pricing. The purpose of this research is to explore ways for the
industry to influence greater change. Chapter 1 introduces environmental risk and explores what
factors influence behaviors to mitigate risk. Chapter 2 provides an in depth overview of the
insurance industry, including its history, business practices, and varying products. Chapter 3
highlights how the industry increases awareness of risk and assigns a monetary price through
premiums. Chapter 4 highlights how the industry already reduces physical risk by incentivizing
mitigation and adaptation behavior as well as advocacy. Chapter 5 provides recommendations to
the industry to further reduce physical risk, followed by challenges to these opportunities in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 1: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
Climate change is regarded as a significant source of risk and opportunity facing the
private and public sectors. It is anticipated to “influence all aspects of industry, including internal
operations and infrastructure, client engagement, product development and innovation,
investment analysis and modeling, and credit policies” (Brimble, Stewart, & de Zwaan, 2010, p.
72). The economic and social costs of severe weather events have influenced business to
acknowledge and adequately prepare for more frequent and significant loss from environmental
risks.
Environmental risk is defined as the potential for adverse financial impacts arising from
environmental losses (Rogers, 2005). The degree of risk varies based on the probability of an
event occurring times its consequences or impact (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2012). The
International Council of Scientific Union’s Scientific Committee on Problems of the
Environment (1980) identified seven characteristics that are unique to environmental risk and are
important to consider for management efforts; they state that environmental risks:
1. Involve a complex series of cause and effect relationships;
2. Are connected to each other—so several or many risks occur simultaneously within the
same country, region, or city;
3. Are connected to social benefits so that a reduction in one risk usually means a decline in
the social benefits derived from accepting the risk;
4. Are widespread over the globe and concern many countries, both developed and
developing;
5. Are not always easy to identify;
6. Can never be measured precisely; and
7. Are evaluated differently in social terms—so the severity of risk may differ based on the
person or society that is experiencing it. (The International Council of Scientific Union,
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, 1980)
Environmental risk can be further broken down into five types—regulatory, physical,
competitive, legal, and reputational (Ceres, 2010). Table 1 describes these types of risk. Physical
7

risk is conceptually different from other forms of risk and includes the impact of nature beyond a
party’s control. Physical risk encompasses climate change, seasonality, natural disasters, and
weather conditions (Dobler et al., 2012). Physical risk arising from environmental losses is the
focus of this research.
Table 1
Types of environmental risk and descriptions
Type of risk

Description of risk

Regulatory

New regulation on pollution limits or greenhouse gas emissions may
pose new costs and compliance obligations to some companies.
A new set of regulatory expectations and/or a changing physical
environment could lead to a new competitive environment, through
increased fuel costs or an increase in competition for dwindling
resources, such as water, leading to other increased costs.
Potential losses from litigation, especially from those seeking damages
from alleged contributors to climate change.
Companies may face reputational losses if they are associated with
climate-related damages or perceived mismanagement of the climate
change risk environment.
Physical damage from natural catastrophes like hurricanes, floods, and
winter storms.

Competitive

Legal
Reputational
Physical

Note: Excerpt from “Climate Change Risk Perception and Management: A Survey of Risk Managers,”
by Ceres, 2010.

The importance of predicting physical risk
Destructive weather has proven that the economic wellbeing of any institution, be it
governmental or a private company, is in some way influenced by the changes that occur in the
environment. Kenneth Abraham, a scholar and teacher in the field of insurance law, predicted
this influence in his book Distributing Risk (1986). Abraham hypothesized that “if one can
predict changes in the environment, one may reasonably predict the broad outlines of the change
that may occur within the institution concerned” (1986, p. 1).
Companies are increasingly aware of the potential impact of environmental risk and their
reliance on natural resources in their supply chain (The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2013). A survey of corporate risk managers conducted by Zurich, a private insurance
company; the Professional Risk Managers’ International Association; and Ceres, a non-profit
8

organization advocating for sustainability leadership, assessed whether and to what extent risk
mangers are worried about the risks from climate change, including physical and regulatory risk.
The resulting report analysis revealed concern about nearer-term physical risk from climate
change was stronger than expected. The physical damage from catastrophic weather events are
heavily publicized, but disasters can also impact supply chains and business operations.
Respondents of the survey expressed concern that physical effects could “affect business by
compromising their physical assets, disrupting supply chains or raising the costs of commodities
such as water” (Ceres, 2010, p. 21).
Companies and governments alike strive to predict such changes in the environment and
pursue environmental preparedness strategies to avoid or reduce the impact of losses. The United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2013) acknowledges that risk management in
business processes is increasingly seen as a key to resilience, competiveness, and sustainability.
Savings from effective risk management may even fund other corporate activities (The United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2013). Such proactive environmental management is
necessary to minimize losses and increase future cost savings, and has lead to several innovative
and non-traditional collaborations.
For the last six years, Cola-Cola has partnered with the World Wildlife Fund to “help
conserve and protect the world’s freshwater, as well as to address the challenges that affect
water, including climate change and unsustainable agriculture” (World Wildlife Fund & The
Coca-Cola Company, 2013, p. 1). Cola-Cola’s primary ingredient in their products is water. By
protecting freshwater supply quantity and quality, the company can reduce risk and ensure
continued sale of their products. Similarly, Wal-Mart was concerned about being unable to meet
consumer demand due to expected reductions in fish stocks globally caused by unsustainable
fishing (Plambeck & Denend, 2011). Wal-Mart partnered with the Marine Stewardship Council,
who maintains a sustainable fish certification program, to adjust their supply chain to only
purchase fish that are sustainably produced. This successful partnership aims to improve fish
stocks globally, advancing the goals of the Marine Stewardship Council and simultaneously
reducing risk to Wal-Mart’s profits.
These examples illustrate the potential of environmental risk to motivate action, including
innovative solutions through non-traditional partnerships. The type and degree of environmental
risk and opportunities from climate change may vary by industry, but having a diversified view
9

of a company’s environmental exposure is regarded universally as a wise business decision
(Semenova & Hassel, 2008).

Disconnect between risk awareness and mitigation action
Though risk awareness and preparedness are regarded as positive business practice, they
do not always lead to preventative actions. Inaction may be attributed to several factors including
how the risk is assessed and also how it is perceived. Risk can be broken down into “objective
risk”—the variance of a probability distribution of loss-causing events—and “subjective risk”—
the attitude experienced by the individual facing risk (Greene, 1971, p. 7).

Objective risk
One reason for an inadequate mitigation response may be incorrect information, or
inaccurate objective risk. The magnitude of environmental risk is estimated through complex
modeling that is both expensive and time-intensive. Not all governments or companies have
sufficient resources to commit to proper modeling and analysis, which can result in incorrect or
conflicting estimates of environmental risk and inappropriate risk mitigation efforts. For
example, a company that underestimates risk is likely to be inadequately prepared, leading to
greater losses. Alternatively, a company that overestimates risk may tie up more valuable capital
than necessary to protect against less significant losses. Either experience may change a
company’s perception of the benefits of preparedness.

Subjective risk
In addition to reliability of risk information, an individual or institution’s attitude plays a
significant role in whether or not they take appropriate action. This was observed specific to
flood risk perceptions and the relationship to mitigation behavior in the Europe (Bubeck, Botzen,
& Aerts, 2012). Shifting European policies to successfully alleviate flood risks required private
household to take more flood mitigation measures. Understanding the relationship between risk
awareness and mitigation action was important to predict the success of the overall policy to
reduce flood damage.
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Bubeck et al. (2012) hypothesized a positive relationship between awareness of risk and
mitigation behavior. However, they found that such a relationship was hardly observed in
empirical studies, and concluded that high-risk perception does not necessarily result in
improved mitigation behavior. This was in part attributed to the “protection motivation theory,” a
psychological model used to explain decision-making in relation to threats (Figure 1). The model
identifies two appraisal states, “threat appraisal” and “coping appraisal.” Threat appraisal is also
referred to as a risk perception, or how an individual evaluates how threatened they feel in
response to a certain risk. After an individual feels threatened, they begin to transition to coping
appraisal, which involves thinking about benefits of possible actions and evaluation of
competencies to carry them out.

Figure 1: Schematic overview of protection motivation theory. Excerpt from “Protection
motivation and self-efficacy: A revised theory of fear appeals and attitude change,” by J.E. Maddux
and R.W. Rogers, 1983, Journal Of Experimental Social Psychology.

In a study evaluating health-related protective behavior by Maddux and Rogers (1983),
coping appraisal was found to be a greater predictor of action than the threat appraisal
component. Within coping appraisal, perceived self-efficacy, or a person’s perception of whether
or not they are capable of performing a requisite behavior was a key component (Maddux &
Rogers, 1983).
Overall, it is the combination of threat awareness and the benefit of solutions that
determines action. Bubeck et al. (2012) acknowledge this and recommend that risk
11

communications be accompanied by additional information on the effectiveness of flood
measures and guidance on how to implement them. Looking beyond the protection motivation
theory, the authors found that perceptual factors (including “perceived effectiveness of measures,
their estimated costs, and the perceived responsibilities in flood management”) were better
predictors of precautionary behavior than socioeconomic and geographic factors (p. 1493).

Who originates risk awareness and why?
The protection motivation theory and perceptual factors are important to understand what
motivates mitigation behavior once an individual or institution understands the risk. However,
the theory does not identify who is likely to originate risk awareness in the first place. Table 2
identifies four different public and private parties that are likely to originate risk awareness and
possible motives for taking mitigation action. All parties contribute to cumulative risk awareness
and should be considered as part of a broader solution to encourage more mitigation to reduce
risk.
Table 2
Parties that contribute to risk awareness and their motivations

Party
Governments
Non-profits & international
aid
Individual companies
Private insurance industry

Motive for Action
Ultimately responsible for protection of society
through emergency relief and government
infrastructure
Commitment to well-being of the population
exposed to risks
Greater understanding of risk may motivate
changes to operations to reduce exposure and
minimize potential loss
Greater understanding of risk to create business
opportunity to maximize profit and minimize loss

Within the private sector, the insurance industry is well-positioned to further awareness
of climate change and advance mitigation and adaptation solutions (Mills, 2009). Unlike some
other industries, the insurance industry sees action on climate change as being less costly than
inaction. The industry integrates the cost of weather related hazards through models and serves
12

as messengers of implications through policy pricing and terms (Mills, 2009). The geographic
and financial scale of the industry, the largest in the world, also has the potential to educate and
influence policyholders broadly (Mills, 2009).
The insurance industry accumulates more risk than other private industries. Risks are
transferred from individuals and companies to primary insurers through insurance policies.
Primary insurance companies assume the risk of the insured based on terms in a contract for a
fee, the premium. The insurance industry is a powerful driver of the global economy; every
sector of the economy depends on insurance and, similarly, insurers are exposed to risk in every
sector of the economy (Leurig & Dlugolecki, 2013). Insurance companies often purchase
separate coverage to reduce the losses they may incur as a result of the contracts with
policyholders. This additional “insurance for insurance companies” is known as reinsurance
(MarketLine, 2013). The full transfer of risks is then from individuals and companies, through
primary insurers, to the reinsurer (Swiss Re, 2013c). The reinsurance sector assumes the risk of
other insurance policy holders from various sectors globally including, but not limited to, energy,
chemical production, and agriculture.
An analogy for the accumulation of risk by the insurance and reinsurance sectors is the
accumulation of mercury in a food chain. Plankton exposed to mercury is eaten in large
quantities by smaller fish, so the mercury concentration in the small fish is higher than that of the
individual plankton. A larger fish eats the smaller fish, and the chain continues, ending with the
apex predator—the tuna. The tuna, having consumed the other species, also accumulates their
mercury and is left with a potentially harmful level. This is comparable to the risk transfer of a
policyholder to ultimately a reinsurance company. For example, risk of wind damage is
transferred from the homeowner to the primary insurer through a policy. The homeowner pays
the insurance company a premium to protect themself from a greater magnitude of risk. The
primary insurer covers multiple policies from homeowners and consolidates their risk. A
primary insurer may enter into a separate contract with a reinsurer to reduce their level of
consolidated risk. The insurer similarly pays a premium to the reinsurer to protect themself from
risk of damages. Should a severe hurricane occur and cause damage from wind, multiple
homeowners will file claims to their primary insurers to cover the cost of damages. Depending
on the terms of the contract with the reinsured, the primary insurer will then pay a portion of the
refunds to the homeowners and file a claim to the reinsurance company. Similar to the affect of
13

mercury to the tuna, too much risk can be negative to the reinsurer and may result in decreased
profit.
As the magnitude of environmental risk increases globally with climate change, so does
the risk increase to the insurance and reinsurance sectors. Due to this concentration of risk, both
insurance and reinsurance companies within the industry have an incentive to understand and
possibly reduce environmental risk.
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CHAPTER 2: FINANCIAL RISK TRANSFER: OVERVIEW OF
THE INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE SECTORS
The insurance industry shares risk by shifting financial consequences from one party to
another. This chapter provides an overview of the industry, including both the insurance and
reinsurance sectors, to introduce different parties and mechanisms to transfer risk. A greater
emphasis is placed on reinsurance because it is a critical component of transferring risk globally
but generally less familiar to the public. The chapter concludes with non-traditional insurance
and reinsurance products that are also used to share risk.

Traditional primary insurance
Primary insurance provides coverage that transfers financial risk from the insured to the
insurer. Several key terms are helpful to define:
•

An insured is a person, business, or organization that is covered by an insurance policy.

•

A loss is a decrease in net assets for which no revenue is obtained.

•

Risk is the uncertainty of loss, chance of loss, or the variance of actual loss from
expected results as it relates to coverage. The risk is unique to the object of insurance
protection (e.g., a building, an automobile, a human life, or exposure to liability).

•

An insurance company, also known as the insurer, sells insurance policies that protect
the insured against financial hardship caused by financial losses. Insurers accept the risk
of the insured, collect premiums, and pay losses.

•

Insurance premium is a periodic payment to the insurer in exchange for insurance
coverage. Included in payment are also the administrative fees of the insurer to create and
manage the policy. (Reinsurance Association of America, 2007)
Combining these terms, insurance is “a system by which a risk is transferred by a person,

business, or organization to an insurance company, which reimburses the insured for covered
losses and provides for sharing the costs of losses among the insured” (Smith & Wiening, 1994,
p. 3). This transfer of risk is finalized through a contract, or insurance policy, that states the
rights and duties of the insurer and the insured. The primary duty of contracts is to confirm the
responsibility of the insurance company to indemnify the policyholder.
15

The contract also confirms the insurance deductible, the amount of loss borne by the
insured and the premium price. The deductible is the amount the insured has to pay out-of-pocket
for expenses before the insurance company will cover any remaining costs. Higher deductibles
generally result in lower premiums because the insurer is responsible for less loss. The premium
price is determined in part by the possibility of risk; when a loss is almost certain, insurance
companies charge a premium as high as the expected loss. The insurer uses the premium to pay
claims for occurred loss in excess of the deductible, pay expenses including the cost of operation
for the insurer, and generate profits (Smith & Wiening, 1994). It is important that the premium
be high enough to adequately cover payout of future losses, but low enough to not be excessive.
As discussed in Chapter 4, premium pricing can incentivize loss control, including proactive
efforts to mitigate risk, by rewarding the insured with lower premium rates. Conversely, higher
premium prices may be a disincentive for more risky behavior, including development in
catastrophe prone area.

Profit
The insurance sector generates profits by paying out less than what is receives in premiums
and investing the net amount, or reserve. The interest on the investments is subject to corporate
income taxes. If a company incorrectly assesses the risk or prices a premium too low, it may
have to pay out to policyholders more money than what it received in premiums. With smaller or
no reserves, the company makes fewer or no investments—something that hurts both the
company’s profit and possibly also the broader economy. The investment activity of the
insurance sector is in fact very significant. American insurers are one of the world’s largest
investors, controlling nearly 5 trillion USD in invested capital (Insurance Information Institute,
n.d.; Leurig & Dlugolecki, 2013). The insurance sector also provides financial support to
policyholders when disasters occur. This can allow a rapid return to pre-disaster business and
social activity, which can drastically impact the broader economy.

Government regulation and insurance
Federal and state governments acknowledge the impact of the insurance sector on the
wellbeing of policyholders and the larger economy. They regulate reserve amounts, impact
16

private premium prices, and serve as public insurers. Governments require that insurance
companies have adequate reserves on hand that are large enough to pay back all the unearned
premium on all of their policies (Smith, 1964). The benefit of this reserve requirement is that
policyholders will receive a full payout when needed. However, the need to maintain these
reserves reduces the amount of policies that an insurance company can take on as well as the
amount that they can invest. This may ultimately result in less profit to the company and less
available coverage to society.
Governments also regulate private insurance rates as a means to keep risk coverage rates
low and affordable to residents. Some states in the United States regulate current premium prices
as well as any proposed rate changes from private insurance companies to ensure coverage
remains affordable (Smith & Wiening, 1994). Though these regulations are in place to provide
aid to society, they may indirectly encourage risky behavior by pricing premiums too low (Israel,
2013).
In addition to regulating the reserve and private premium prices, some governments also
serve as the insurance provider (Kousky, 2011). Many natural hazards are insured through
private insurance companies, but some insurance (like flood and crop insurance), are managed
through government programs (Mills, 2005). Federal and state insurance programs offer
insurance to residents who cannot obtain policies in the voluntary or private market (Kousky,
2011). Federal programs are designed to protect the population against risks from disasters that
were historically deemed uninsurable by the private market because of their scale of impact
(Mills & Lecomte, 2006). The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), for instance, provides
flood insurance to property owners in flood zones including many coastal areas.
Most state catastrophe programs were established after an extreme event that depleted
reserves of private insurers and reinsurers. As a result of depleted reserves, insurance companies
increased premium prices, reduced coverage, limited the number of policies, or withdrew from
the high-risk locations altogether (Kousky, 2011). Governments stepped in to offer coverage and
regulate rates. In Florida, insurance is provided directly to consumers through the Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation. To make public insurance more affordable, premiums are often
priced below the true cost of risk and subsidized. As an example, Citizens subsidizes those in the
highest-risk areas by charging more of policyholders throughout the state (Kousky, 2011).
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The importance of risk based premium pricing
Risk based premium pricing is essential for a provider to be solvent. Government programs
that price premiums below the cost of risk can result in program debt. Federal and state insurance
programs have had varying degrees of success (Table 3). NFIP was bankrupted 10-times over by
Hurricane Katrina and as of February 2014, was 24 billion USD in debt (Koba, 2014; Mills &
Lecomte, 2006). The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) is an example of a successful state
program. The CEA’s success is attributed to risk based premium pricing that is not subsidized.
For the private insurance sector, not using risk based premium pricing results in less profit. The
impact of premiums to influence behavior to reduce physical risk is described in Chapters 3 and
4.
Table 3
Selected legislative and policy responses to highlight initiatives that have had varying degrees of
success in advancing risk mitigation and providing appropriate insurance coverage
Insurance

Type of Program

Citizens’ Property
Insurance
Corporation/ Florida
Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund
(Florida)

Government-run
property and casualty
insurance pool and
reinsurance fund for
wind and hurricane.

National Flood
Insurance
Program (US)

Government flood
insurance program
authorized by statute.
Original intent was to
decrease reliance on ad
hoc post disaster relief
by offering insurance
to those most at risk.

California
Earthquake
Authority
(CEA)

Publicly managed,
privately funded
residential earthquake
insurance provider.

Status (as of 2011)
Citizens’ issues almost 1.3
million policies (18% of
admitted Florida market) 18
Citizens’ 11 billion USD
shortfall in 100-year event
would be covered by
assessments.
More than 5.6 million
properties insured; current
17.8 billion USD deficit.

CEA is solvent; however,
only approximately 12% of
market is covered.

Issues
Reliance on post-loss
funding.

Risk mitigation measures
required by the program
are not always
implemented or enforced;
flood maps are out of date;
limited ability of the
program to adjust
premiums or coverage to
reflect risk.
Fiscally solvent; risk
based premium pricing;
State does not subsidize
CEA and vice-versa;
inadequate uptake because
of cost of premiums,
resulting in part from high
mandated reinsurance
costs and from large risks
of properties without
retrofits.

Note: Excerpt from “Managing the escalating risks of natural catastrophes in the United
States,” by Lloyds, 2011.

18

Traditional reinsurance
Traditional reinsurance can help both private and government insurers reduce potential
losses by transferring financial risk. The success of the reinsurance sector requires that risk be
fully recognized and priced accordingly, especially given the increasing magnitude of risk from
climate change.
Reinsurance is commonly described as insurance for insurance companies. Though this
oversimplification does exclude critical details of the sector, it does capture the basic business,
which includes “a financial transaction by which an insurance company is indemnified for all or
a portion of some risk by another insurer” (Abramovsky, 2008). Through this transaction, risks
are transferred from individuals and companies, through primary insurers, to the reinsurer (Swiss
Re, 2013c). Self-insured parties also purchase reinsurance. Self-insured parties are those that set
aside money to compensate for the potential future loss themselves rather than taking out a
primary insurance policy.
The insurance company purchasing reinsurance is known as the ceding insurer. The
company selling reinsurance is known as the reinsurer. Reinsurance reduces financial risk to the
ceding insurer because it provides reimbursement for losses covered by the reinsurance
agreement (American Management Association, 1964). This allows the ceding insurer to offer
primary insurance coverage for unpredictable events and still limit their exposure when large
losses occur.
Perhaps equally important to understanding the role of reinsurance is to understand what
reinsurance is not. Though reinsurance can transfer financial risk and provide liquidity to reduce
indirect damage, it does not alter the total risk exposure (Reinsurance Association of America,
2007; Warner et al., 2009). Though modeling helps to better understand risks to price premiums
and policies accordingly, reinsurance “does not make exposure more predictable or desirable”
(Reinsurance Association of America, 2007, p. 6). Reinsurance and insurance companies can
incentivize risk management techniques and mitigation behavior as a means to reduce risk, a
concept described in Chapter 4. Though some reinsurers also offer risk preparedness as a
separate service in order to proactively reduce risk at the operating or local level, this is not a
standard component of reinsurance to transfer risk.
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Motivation for buying reinsurance
The motive for an insurance company or self-insured party to purchase reinsurance is the
same motive that prompts individuals and businesses to purchase primary insurance—“to reduce
uncertainty by transferring some risks and sharing losses” (Smith & Wiening, 1994, p. 41). This
coverage may seem redundant and perhaps unnecessary, but it is critical to limit liability of a
primary insurance company. Insurers purchase reinsurance for four main reasons: 1) limit
liability, 2) provide stabilization, 3) increase capacity, and 4) provide catastrophe protection
(Reinsurance Association of America, 2007) (Table 4). Because of reinsurance, primary
insurance companies can offer policyholders adequate coverage, keep prices of policies
affordable, and reduce operating costs globally.
Table 4
Motives to purchase reinsurance
Limit
liability

Stabilization

Increased
capacity

Catastrophe
protection

Reinsurance provides a mechanism through which insurers limit their loss
exposure by transferring risk from the reinsured to the reinsurer. The
reinsurer is then required to maintain adequate reserves to pay back
unearned premium on all of its policies and not the reinsured
(Abramovsky, 2008). This enables them to take on additional
policyholders or invest a portion of their reserve. This also benefits the
primary policyholder because the primary insurer can offer higher
coverage limits.
Insurers, as well as reinsurers, experience fluctuations in profit and loss
margins in part because the work includes pricing a product (or coverage)
whose actual cost will not be known until a future time. Insurers can
stabilize their overall operating results and reduce fluctuations in loss
experience through reinsurance.
Underwriting expenses include direct and indirect costs that an insurance
company pays to issue a policy. Generally, the lower these expenditures
are as a proportion of premiums earned, the higher the profitability of the
insurer. Through reinsurance, the reinsured (or ceding company) shares a
portion of these underwriting expenses with the reinsurer, contributing to
a higher profitability.
Reinsurance offers catastrophe protection to cover financial loss from a
single event (like a fire) as well as the aggregation of smaller claims from
a single event (like an earthquake). Such protection reduces the loss
experience to the insurer (Reinsurance Association of America, 2007).

Note: Excerpt from “Fundamentals of property and casualty reinsurance with a glossary of reinsurance
terms,” by Reinsurance Association of America, 2007.
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Creation of traditional reinsurance contracts
The reinsurance contract and included pricing may influence the behavior of primary
insurance companies and the people they insure (Abramovsky, 2008). It is important to
understand the creation and content of reinsurance contracts in order to understand this potential
influence. The reinsurance contract is an agreement between the reinsurer and reinsured based on
the business needs, and no two contracts are exactly alike. Two basic types of categories are
generally used: treaty and facultative (Reinsurance Association of America, 2007). These types
of reinsurance contracts are often combined.
A treaty is a reinsurance contract that often covers entire portions of risk that fall within
their terms and may cover a long period of time. Treaty reinsurers do not review the individual
risks and instead rely on the underwriting philosophy of the reinsured (Reinsurance Association
of America, 2007). Treaties are also referred to as obligatory or automatic contracts. Facultative
reinsurance contracts cover individual or unusual risk, and the reinsurer conducts its own risk
review to analyze the potential severity of losses, determine the premium pricing, and whether or
not to accept the risk (Abramovsky, 2008; Munich Re, 2010; Papenfuzz, 1964). Given the unique
coverage, facultative reinsurance is often used to cover catastrophic risks and other lowincidence, high-risk loss risks.
Thorough risk models are essential to determine premiums and deductibles for coverage;
these models may be proprietary to the company or contracted separately from a third party. If
the reinsurer does not price risk of expected losses accordingly, they may reduce their potential
profit. As stated previously related to insurance, reinsurance premium pricing can incentivize
loss control or proactive efforts to mitigate risk by rewarding the ceding insurer with lower rates.
Both treaties and facultative reinsurance may be written on either a proportional or excess
of loss basis, or a combination of both (Reinsurance Association of America, 2007). Proportional
(or pro rata) reinsurance requires the reinsurer to pay for an agreed upon percentage of losses by
the reinsured, while excess of loss reinsurance only occurs when the amount of loss is in excess
an agreed upon amount. Proportional reinsurance is often used in property insurance because it
provides catastrophic protection (Munich Re, 2010).
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Types of traditional reinsurance
The type and amount of necessary reinsurance varies based in part on an insurer’s
exposure to different kinds of risk. Different categories of reinsurance include property,
including coverage from natural catastrophes, fire, and wind; casualty or liability, including
product liability or employers’ liability insurance; and life and health, which are indirectly
affected by catastrophic events. Property is the largest segment of the global reinsurance market,
accounting for 38.5% of the market's total value. The Life Insurance segment accounts for a
further 36.1% of the market (Market Line, 2013). A breakdown of the major categories is
included in Table 5.
Table 5
Global reinsurance market category segmentation: million USD, 2012
Category

2012

%

Property

89.9

38.5%

Life Insurance

84.2

36.1%

Liability

55.0

23.6%

Financial lines

4.4

1.9%

233.5

100%

Total

Note: Excerpt from “Global reinsurance [Industry overview],” by Marketline, 2013

The category most likely to be influenced by climate change is property reinsurance. A
subset of this is catastrophic property reinsurance, which “covers accidental losses resulting from
damage to property of the insurer” from natural catastrophic events (Swiss Re, 2013c). Many
major risks from climate change are covered under catastrophic reinsurance, and those with
“exposures to natural catastrophe risks tend to rely particularly heavily on reinsurance” (Swiss
Re, 2013c). Catastrophic reinsurance may also include coverage resulting from terrorism
activities.

Overview of reinsurance providers
The reinsurance industry has a strong capital base, including an annual premium income
of around 220 billion USD in 2011 and shareholder equity of about the same amount (Swiss Re,
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2013c). This capital base allows reinsurers to take on the world’s largest and most complex risks.
Though the scale of the reinsurance sector itself is large, it is actually dominated by relatively
few major companies and geographies. The ten biggest reinsurers account for two thirds or the
market (Swiss Re, 2013c). Of those, four companies—Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hanover Re, and
Lloyd’s of London—generated 43.3% of the global market’s share in 2012 (Table 6). The
geographic segmentation of reinsurance is similarly concentrated—the Americas account for
51.9% of the global reinsurance market value and Europe accounts for a 36.2% of the global
market (Table 7).

Table 6
Global reinsurance market share: % share, by value, 2012
Company

% Share

Munich Re

15.5%

Swiss Re

13.6%

Hannover Re

7.6%

Lloyd’s of London

6.6%

Other

56.7%

Total

100%

Note: Excerpt from “Global reinsurance [Industry overview],” by Marketline, 2013

Table 7
Global reinsurance market geography segmentation: million USD, 2012
Geography

2012

%

Americas

121.2

51.9

Europe

84.5

36.2

Asia-Pacific

21.4

9.2

Rest of World

6.5

2.8

233.6

100%

Total

Note: Excerpt from “Global reinsurance [Industry overview],” by Marketline, 2013
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Non-traditional insurance and reinsurance products
Traditional insurance and reinsurance indemnify the ceding party for losses, and pays out
based on actual losses incurred depending on the terms agreed upon in the contract in exchange
for premiums. This model is how the majority of ceding companies transfer risk, but nontraditional products offer additional methods of coverage. These include: parametric insurance,
micro insurance, and catastrophe (CAT) bonds. These non-traditional products are being
purchased more frequently from insurance and reinsurance companies as well as financial
competitors as a way to reduce risk, especially in developing nations. These non-traditional
products are not the focus of this research, but should be acknowledged as a way for the industry
to transfer risk.

Parametric insurance
Parametric insurance is referred to as an index-based policy because it uses weather
indexes, like precipitation, to determine payouts (Swiss Re, 2011). Unlike traditional
reinsurance, which pays out only after losses are incurred and claims are filed, payment from
parametric insurance occurs when local climatic conditions deviate from an agreed upon
benchmark or index. The weather parameter (e.g., temperature or precipitation), benchmark
(often informed by historic averages), degree of deviation, and payment amount are identified in
the contract (Israel, 2013). Examples of deviation include less than expected rainfall during a
drought or each time rainfall exceeds a chosen threshold over a set amount of time. The payment
amount varies based on the amount deviation that occurs, and models aim to reflect the predicted
damage on the ground (Swiss Re, 2011).
A benefit of the index-based contracts is that payment to the ceding party happens more
quickly than traditional reinsurance. This is in large part because it excludes the need for
damages to be assessed and claims filed. A quick payout is particularly valuable for developing
countries that lack reserves and would otherwise have to rely on foreign aid to fund damage
repair. This allows developing countries to return local societies and economies to their predisaster functions. It is similarly beneficial to the reinsurers because the payout has little case
work and administrative costs. Parametric insurance can also be applied in places where
insufficient data is available to support standard reinsurance risk analysis (Swiss Re, 2011).
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Microinsurance
Microinsurance is similar to traditional insurance and reinsurance in that it offers
protection against risks. However, the product is aimed at low-income individuals or businesses
that do not qualify for larger scale coverage (Allianz, 2013; Warner et al., 2009). Allianz, an
international financial services company that offers various forms of insurance and reinsurance
coverage, established four criteria that are used to identity their microinsurance products from
other products that similarly transfer risk: “1) insurance principles are applied, 2) product is
based in a developing country or emerging market, 3) great majority (approximately 80%) of
insured people or assets from low-income segment, and 4) product is based in a country that
receives no more than 50% of government subsidies” (Allianz & GIZ, 2013). A product must
fulfill all of these criteria to qualify as a microinsurance product. Due to limited asset value and
data, micro insurance is typically based on a parametric model.
The social and business benefits of microinsurance are listed in Table 8. Though micro
insurance premium prices are low, the market size is quite high. The world population includes
2.6 billion people with income ranging from 1.25 to 4 USD per day. This results in an estimated
40 billion USD potential from premiums per year (Swiss Re, 2010). In addition, through the aid
provided through microinsurance companies, individuals may enter into higher wealth levels and
eventually require classic insurance coverage (Allianz, 2013).
Table 8
Social and business benefits of micro insurance
Social benefits

Business benefits

Protecting vulnerable people

Driving innovation and cost efficiency

Expanding financial inclusion

Generating reasonable profits in the short term

Safe-guarding hard-won income gains

Branding opportunity

Note: Excerpt from “Microinsurance at Allianz group: 2013 half year report,” by Allianz, 2013.

Catastrophe bonds
Catastrophe, or CAT, bonds are the most common form of insurance-linked securities,
and are a means of ceding insurance-related risk to the capital market (Swiss Re, 2011). CAT
bonds are similar to parametric insurance in that payment is triggered by an index-based policy;
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CAT bonds are different because they transfer from a reinsurance or insurance company to an
investor in the capital market.
Risk holders or issuers (usually a government or insurance company) issue CAT bonds
through an investment bank to private investors. The contract identifies index-based criteria that
determine terms of payment. If the index-based event does not occur, then the risk holder pays
the enhanced coupon to the investor for the term of the bond and receives principal back at
maturity. If the risk holder suffers a loss determined by the index-based policy, then they are not
obligated to pay interest and/or repay a portion of the principle (Risk Management Solutions,
2012). The avoided interest and principal would be used to pay out insurance policyholders.
CAT bonds are high risk but still attractive to investors because they represent an asset class that
is separate from the global financial market (Risk Management Solutions, 2012).
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CHAPTER 3: AWARENESS OF RISK & PRICE OF RISK
The insurance industry plays an important role in raising awareness of environmental
risk, including the predicted impact of climate change. Recall that insurers and reinsurers use
complex modeling to predict loss from risk in order to price premiums appropriately. Many
insurers forecast weather patterns using climate science in their models because past weather
related disaster experience has proven to be an ineffective predictor of future losses (Mills, 2012;
Thistlethwaite, 2012). Including such forecasting in models essentially puts a price tag on
climate change, which can aid in increasing the awareness of the risk.
Risk based premiums are likely more expensive because they capture the appropriate
magnitude of potential loss. This higher premium price can pass from a reinsurer to the primary
insurer and finally to the original policyholder, where the loss physically occurs. In response to
higher reinsurance premium rates, primary insurance companies may either reduce their
reinsurance coverage or raise rates to policyholders. Reduced reinsurance coverage requires the
primary insurer to absorb more risk, which may result in lower profits. Consequently, the insurer
may try to reduce their cumulative level of risk by reducing primary insurance coverage
availability, providing stricter terms to policyholders, or withdrawing from a location
completely. This last option leaves the resident of that geography without private coverage and
responsible for more loss, which may encourage government intervention of pricing or coverage.
Alternatively, the company may decide to maintain the high level of risk but charge more from
policyholders through higher primary insurance premium rates. Higher premium rates increase
awareness of risk at the individual level—where the physical risk actually occurs. This financial
cost may be a disincentive for more risk-prone locations and practices. The influence of risk
based premium pricing to incentivize risk reduction behavior is described in Chapter 4.

Awareness beyond policyholders
The insurance industry has helped society understand and adapt to emerging risk through
both policy prices and awareness through education (Mills, 2009). This can occur on a
transactional basis from reinsurer to policyholder, described above, or at a greater scale by
partnering with government and non-profit organizations to expand knowledge sharing beyond
their policyholders.
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The reinsurance company Swiss Re is a member of The Economics of Climate
Adaptation Working Group (Working Group), a partnership of members from the public, private,
and social sectors. The Working Group produced a report Shaping Climate Resilient
Development: A Framework for Decision-Making that shares a practical analytical toolkit to aid
decision-making and resource allocation for adaptation efforts in order to “operate our
economies more efficiently and more consciously of the risks inherent in the climate forces
around us” (Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group, 2009). The framework includes
tools to quantify a location’s total climate risk and evaluates measures to adapt to the expected
risk using a cost-benefit discipline. Such measures include solutions from infrastructure,
technology, and behavior. The Working Group recognizes that a larger purpose of the report is to
help shift countries’ development paths towards greater climate resilience through adaptation.
The report states that adaptation does not replace the need for reducing emissions, which is
critical to reduce risk. Finally, the Working Group identifies roles of particular stakeholders,
including the private sector that can, and do, provide services and products that provide climate
risk management benefits. Cited as an example are insurance incentives for adaptation behavior.
The Working Group partnership and report provide an opportunity to increase awareness of risk
and should be replicated.
Risk awareness and financial indicators through insurance rates may be important
incentives to change business and public behavior. Chapter 4 summarizes existing mitigation and
adaptation behavior to reduce risk that is motivated in part through insurance industry pricing
and incentives.
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CHAPTER 4: PHYSICAL RISK REDUCTION
In addition to transferring financial risk from the insured, the insurance industry may also
be able to reduce the magnitude of loss from physical risk by incentivizing different behavior.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states “insurance and other forms of
risk transfer can be linked to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation by enabling
recovery, reducing vulnerability, and providing knowledge and incentives for reducing risk”
(2012, p. 525). Risk reduction is beneficial to the insurance industry because it decreases the
potential magnitude of loss, increases risk predictability, and could help to preserve insurability
of high-risk areas (Geneva Association, 2013b; Mills & Lecomte, 2006).
The previous chapter describes how the insurance and reinsurance sectors raise
awareness of risk through models and by assigning a price to risk. Both are important factors to
encourage risk management behavior that reduces physical risk. This chapter outlines ways in
which the insurance industry currently helps to reduce the magnitude of loss from physical risk
by incentivizing disaster risk mitigation efforts by policyholders and through the industry’s own
advocacy and investments towards climate change mitigation. Before continuing, it is helpful to
define related but different terms commonly used to describe risk reduction (Table 9).
Table 9
Definitions from the IPCC related to risk reduction
Term
Mitigation (of
climate
change)
Mitigation (of
disaster risk
and disaster)

Definition
A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse
gases to reduce the rate of climate change.

Adaptation

In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and
its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In
natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects;
human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate.
Processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, policies, and
measures to improve the understanding of disaster risk, foster disaster risk
reduction and transfer, and promote continuous improvement in disaster

Disaster risk
management

The lessening of the potential adverse impacts of physical hazards (including
those that are human-induced) through actions that reduce hazard, exposure,
and vulnerability, including the use of different disaster risk management
measures.
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Disaster risk
reduction

Disaster
management

preparedness, response, and recovery practices, with the explicit purpose of
increasing human security, well-being, quality of life, resilience, and
sustainable development. Disaster risk management can be divided to comprise
two related but discrete subareas or components: disaster risk reduction and
disaster management.
Denotes both a policy goal or objective, and the strategic and instrumental
measures employed for anticipating future disaster risk, reducing existing
exposure, hazard, or vulnerability, and improving resilience. This includes
lessening the vulnerability of people, livelihoods, and assets and ensuring the
appropriate sustainable management of land, water, and other components of
the environment.
Social processes for designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies,
policies, and measures that promote and improve disaster preparedness,
response, and recovery practices at different organizational and societal levels

Note: Excerpt from “Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change
adaption,” by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012, pages 556-561

The business motive for reducing physical risk
Insured catastrophe losses are growing faster than premiums, populations, and gross
domestic product in the United States (Mills, Roth, & Lemote, 2005). As mentioned in Chapter
3, in order to reduce their risk of financial loss, insurance and reinsurance companies may
withdraw from high-risk areas, raise premium prices, or limit coverage terms. These reactions
could ultimately lead to a decreased business and criticism from consumers, investors, and
regulators (Mills & Lecomte, 2006). The insurance industry acknowledges that a more proactive
approach, like disaster risk management and mitigation strategies, is necessary to make risk more
predictable and minimize losses. Swiss Re observes, “financing risk after the event has occurred
(e.g. by issuing debt, raising taxes, relying on international aid) is becoming unsustainable given
the magnitude of disasters and the growing risk exposure” (Swiss Re, 2009).
The insurance industry can incentivize risk management by sending financial signals
through coverage availability, terms, and pricing (Mills, 2007). Higher premium prices can prove
a disincentive to development in high-risk geographies. Conversely, parties that improve disaster
resilience may be offered lower premium rates.
Encouraging behavior that results in lower physical risk and possibly lower premium
prices may seem counterintuitive, especially since premiums are assets on the insurers’ financial
balance sheets. The business rationale for encouraging lower physical risk is twofold. The first
has to do with risk prediction. If the expected loss can be more confidently predicted because of
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mitigation efforts like building codes, insurance and reinsurance companies can reduce
unforeseen losses and more confidently set lower premium prices for the given risk. The second
rationale is because of competition between companies. If Company A has a better
understanding of potential risk than Company B, they will likely demand a higher premium price
from the ceding party. As a result, Company B may appear more attractive than Company A
because of the lower premium. Accepting a lower premium price than the risk based amount
does not make sense for Company A if the risk remains the same, but if the company can
encourage risk reduction behavior by the insured party then they may be able to reduce the
overall risk. Upon successful implementation of this behavior, Company A can offer reduced
premium rates to the insured party thus making them more or equally attractive compared to
Company B. In the long run, any company that fails to acknowledge the true price of risk will be
unsuccessful.

Ways the insurance industry currently reduces physical risk
The insurance industry recognizes that reducing the magnitude of loss from physical risk
is critical to ensure risks remain insurable. As such, they play an active role in reducing physical
risk by advocating new regulations and incentivizing mitigation. The list below captures some of
the ways that the industry already reduces risk.
1. Improvements to building and infrastructure codes & standards
2. Awareness of land use impact
3. Climate change advocacy to reduce emissions
4. Self regulation of the industry
5. Financing of emissions reducing technology and projects
This list is by no means intended to be an exhaustive overview of how the insurance and
reinsurance sectors can reduce physical risk. Excluded from mention in this chapter is the
important role of non-traditional products, especially microinsurance and CAT bonds, to increase
mitigation and reduce risk to society in developing countries. The importance of these products
is growing as populations increase in developing countries globally.
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1. Improvements to building and infrastructure codes and standards
Building and infrastructure codes establish a regulated standard to protect the public’s
safety, health, and general wellbeing. According the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)(2014b), modern building codes are fostered by four entities: “the insurance industry
who promotes the establishment of standards to minimize accidents/claims; social organizations
who look to eliminate squalor and impact on health; local governments who develop regulations
to deliver health and safety to taxpayers; and disasters.” The insurance industry promotes
commercial and residential building standards to mitigate the loss of physical damage. The
Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) is made up of insurer and reinsurer
members and encourages building codes and standards in the United Sates. Through their Rating
the States report, the IBHS evaluates and compares regulations and processes in the 18 states at
highest risk of hurricanes. The report is intended to raise transparency of existing state building
codes and advocate for updated codes (2013).
Absent legislation, the industry can use price as a persuasive instrument to promote
stronger buildings on safer sites (Geneva Association, 2013a). A successful example is the
California Earthquake Authority, a public-private cooperation between state insurance and
private companies. Property owners pay lower premiums when they take measures to retrofit
structures to prevent earthquake damage (Geneva Association, 2013a).

2. Awareness of land use impact
Land use refers to both a set of human actions in a certain land cover and “the social and
economic purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, and
conservation)” (IPCC, 2013, p. 561). Land use management decisions can result in different
exposure to physical risk. One significant decision is where development occurs. Insurers use
models to highlight different physical risk and can put a price on a location. In addition to
advocating for building codes, the IBHS “encourages better decision-making about where we
build in regard to natural hazards” (Institute for Business & Home Safety, n.d.). Absent
legislation, insurers can predict location of high risk and increase coverage rates.
Different land use purposes (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, and conservation) also offer
different mitigation and adaption benefits. The benefits vary from sequestered carbon in soils and
enhanced drought resistance from agricultural soil management, to reduced wildfires and fire
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risk from improved forest management. Land use management decisions impact nearly every
type of insurance type (property, health, etc.) (Mills, 2007). The industry seeks to understand the
mitigation and adaption benefits of such decisions to offer protection from physical risk.

3. Climate change advocacy to reduce emissions
Insurance and reinsurance companies are outspoken about the impact of climate change
and the need to reduce emissions, and regularly engage in proactive public policy discussions to
encourage government intervention (Mills, 2009). The Reinsurance Association of America
(2008) encourages efforts to mitigate human-induced greenhouse gases broadly and evaluates
emissions reduction measures in the operations of its partner organizations. Lloyd’s and Swiss
Re both identify climate change as the reinsurance industry’s number one issue (Thistlethwaite,
2012).
Advocacy extends beyond the efforts of individual companies. Thirty-seven insurance
and reinsurance companies participate in ClimateWise, a voluntary initiative to leverage the
industry’s technical and political authority to offer a “more pro-active and collaborative effort to
reduce the risk of climate change” (ClimateWise, n.d.). Members commit to action identified in
their six principles: “1) lead risk analysis, 2) inform public policy making, 3) support climate
awareness amongst customers, 4) incorporate climate change into investment strategies, 5)
reduce the environmental impact of business, and 6) report and be accountable” (ClimateWise,
2011). Such commitments has resulted in action—independent auditors found 88% of
ClimateWise members comply with these principles and have well-established activities that
support management and assessment of climate risk. Such partnerships strengthen the collective
voice of the industry.

4. Self-regulation in the industry
Some companies within the insurance industry self-regulate to ensure others apply good
modeling and set prices that accurately reflect the true risk. ClimateWise, introduced previously
as contributing to climate change advocacy, is also an example of a self-regulating institution.
The six principles that govern the practices of the 37 companies are certainly important, but the
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potential of ClimateWise to influence the broader insurance industry to expand their authority in
global climate change governance is perhaps of equal importance.
Self-regulation is generally motivated by practical business sense. Reinsurance and
insurance companies offer closely substitutable output—risk management expertise
(Thistlewaite, 2012). Such expertise is generally informed by similar modeling and underwriting
processes, so when information is revealed about a single insurance or reinsurance company, it
reflects to some degree on all companies (Barnett & King, 2008). Though this can be both
positive and negative, it is the harm from a bad decision of a single company that is often more
impactful. For example, if a company makes a mistake or uses insufficient data to model a risk,
they may price their premium too low to reflect the actual cost of the risk. This may lead to
insolvency, when the company can no longer meet its financial obligations to policyholders
when debts (in the forms of claims) become due.
Such a negative example reflects poorly on the industry as a whole. To avoid this
negative industry-wide impression, companies may develop a self-regulatory institution to
generate strategies (Barnett & King, 2008). The benefit of the ClimateWise institution is that the
emerging leaders in the industry encourage other companies to work towards similar standards as
outlined in the six principles, including quality of data and risk analysis. This peer pressure of
sorts ensures that all companies apply the same rigor to pricing premiums. These standards
benefit the broader industry and increase the scale of potential impact.

5. Financing of emissions reducing technology and projects
The insurance industry supports emerging technology and emissions reducing projects by
transferring financial risk, which can encourage different sources of financing. One example is
insuring emissions trading markets. Major emissions trading projects developers try to forwardsell carbon credits to capitalize their projects, but buyers are often unwilling to pay full price due
to the uncertainty of delivery. A reinsurance policy can cover the risks associated with nondelivery, so financial institutions are more likely to lend to developers to begin projects. This has
the dual benefit of adding a new premium stream for the reinsurance company and allowing
capital to help emissions project developers fund their work (Burchell, 2010). Insurance
coverage may not physically reduce emissions, but it does provide necessary financial support
for projects that reduce the emissions sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases to
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proceed. This increases the number of projects that aim to decrease emissions and the rate of
climate change.

35

CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY
The insurance industry is positioned to influence the behavior of nearly every sector
globally due to their influence over ceding insurers and policyholders. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight
ways in which the industry already raises awareness of risk, quantifies the true cost of risk, and
reduces physical risk through mitigation and adaptation. This chapter offers additional
recommendations to the industry to further reduce potential risk while still being mindful of a
company’s bottom line. The recommendations to follow include emerging actions and
partnerships from the industry that occur infrequently and should be replicated. The examples
provided highlight, at a small scale, the impact and business benefit of the recommended
behavior or engagement. Challenges that threaten each of these recommendations are discussed
in Chapter 6.

1. Public/private partnerships
Implementing risk management practices at a large scale can be challenging because it
requires the cooperation of multiple actors to coordinate and fund projects (Geneva Association,
2013a). Partnerships between the public government and private insurance companies can
encourage risk management at a large scale. Governments are well positioned to fund large-scale
mitigation projects because of their responsibility to manage infrastructure and the existing
financial structure through state and federal taxes (Luke & Abramovsky, 2011). Public
infrastructure can include transportation, water, energy, and waste systems and is vital to
economic development and prosperity. It can be funded publicly, privately, or through publicprivate partnerships to cover the high investment cost. The Geneva Association (2013a), a
leading international think tank of the insurance industry, recommends that governments
“consider privately insuring public infrastructure” and “employ insurance industry expertise in
engaging in disaster reduction measures” (p. 10). More formal partnerships between private
companies and public agencies should be put in place to improve solvency of public insurance
programs, increase the occurrence of risk management practices, and increase the pool of people
who have access to coverage.
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Private reinsurance for public coverage
Private reinsurance may be able to improve the solvency of public insurance programs. A
study commissioned by the Congressional Budget Office in 2002 analyzed proposed policies that
would enact federal reinsurance for natural disasters and terrorism risks (Torregrosa, 2002). The
2002 study found that federal reinsurance proposals would be costly to taxpayers and “unlikely
to provide an adequate cushion against losses” (p. 24). Analysts also recognized that the federal
government has had difficulty managing risk effectively through aid programs, in part because
they are obligated to provide assistance to those at risk regardless of whether or not they
purchased coverage. This makes it more challenging for the government to enforce risk based
premium prices. It is the author’s opinion that disadvantages of federal reinsurance outweigh the
advantages identified in the study and that reinsurance from private companies should instead be
pursued. Though the analysts of the Congressional Budget Office study did not make a formal
conclusion, they did suggest other federal policies to promote the supply of insurance including:
offering federal incentives for risk mitigation, reducing federal assistance after disasters,
changing the tax treatment of loss reserves held by insurers, and limiting damage awards. These
suggestions should be encouraged in the public/private partnership.
Especially in the near term, private reinsurance may be better suited at a smaller scale,
like a state or city, rather than at the federal level (C. McHale, personal communication, April
24, 2014). One example is between the Alabama State Insurance Fund (SIF) and reinsurer Swiss
Re (Swiss Re, 2011). In 2010, Alabama became the first state to purchase parametric coverage, a
non-traditional form of reinsurance that transfers natural catastrophe risk to the private party
using index-based triggers. The contract, which ended in 2013, confirmed that SIF would receive
financial compensation in the event that a Category 3 hurricane passed through a designated area
of exposed coast. Neither a follow-up report on the partnership nor an update about whether a
new contract is in place has been shared to date.
The partnership between Swiss Re and SIF provides an example of how public
reinsurance can cover public programs. Governments should pursue such coverage in order to
protect public infrastructure to strengthen public insurance programs and ultimately to improve
the well-being of society following disasters.
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Encourage government incentives to promote risk reducing activities
A partnership between private insurance and public governments can benefit the
government, public, and insurer. The insurance company provides much needed liquidity to
speed up private reconstruction following a disaster in exchange for a risk based premium paid
by the government. This premium cost may incentivize the government to encourage more risk
reducing action by both the public and government.
An important and necessary action that needs to be taken by the government is the
creation and regulation of stronger building codes to ensure infrastructure and buildings are
rebuilt to appropriate standards after a disaster. The government may also consider incentivizing
mitigation efforts by offering tax credits to residents that prove successful completion of
mitigation projects. The payment mechanism could be similar to that of The Energy Policy Act,
which provides federal tax credit to residents that install renewable energy units like solar
electric and wind-energy systems (U.S. Department of Energy, n.d.). A government mitigation
incentive would also require a certification process and official entities endorsed by a state or
local government to ensure the validity of the residential mitigation project, similar to the
approval process of renewable energy projects for the Energy Policy Act.
Governments should offer more incentives to catalyze risk reduction in order to create
more resilient communities. This would decrease physical risk to protect communities and
reduce the magnitude of damages that the government would have to reimburse following a
disaster.

Increase cross-sector collaboration
Large scale changes to building codes and standards often require new partnerships
between the private insurance industry and government agencies, which can be a challenging and
slow process. The Building Climate Resilient Cities model to catalyze cross-sector collaboration
to improve climate resilience in cities provides a framework. A partnership of six organizations
designed and developed a workshop series to insurance industry members and city stakeholders
in Boston, San Diego, and Toronto. The series introduced a process for parties to identify shared
priorities and collectively settle on a local area for comprehensive risk management (Brugmann,
2013, p. 8). The goal of the workshop was to identify areas of mutually beneficial collaboration
with an aim to reduce risk. No follow-up material has been published to date to track progress
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within each of the three cities or other locations that applied the Insurer-City Resiliency Toolkit.
Capturing the progress and lessons learned will be important to update and replicate the series.
The Building Climate Resilient Cities method highlights a way to unify different parties
around a shared mitigation goal to increase the rate of resilience and disaster preparedness.
Given the magnitude of potential risk, this collaboration is critical to expedite large-scale risk
reduction and should be replicated.

2. Risk models
Increase accessibility of data and models
An insurance or reinsurance company may raise awareness of risk by offering greater
transparency of data. As discussed in Chapter 2, complex models are essential to estimate risk
and set a premium price. These models are often either created by a separate party and sold to the
insurer, or created by insurers for their exclusive use. Regardless of origin, the model results and
proper analysis to assess risk distinguish companies from their competitors. This is in part why
the industry has been operating on closed, proprietary data formats with little transparency to the
client or public. This lack of information creates disconnect between the price of risk and a
deeper understanding of the actual risk; this deeper understanding that is necessary to incentivize
a change of high-risk behavior.
Some reinsurance companies that create their own models are increasing transparency by
sharing data and models with clients. Munich Re’s Natural Hazard Assessment Network
(NATHAN) allows primary insurance clients to assess the natural hazard exposure of single risks
and access the latest map and satellite images at any time (Munich Re, 2012). Similarly, Swiss
Re provides CatNet, a database that combines natural hazard information with Google maps and
satellite imagery, to clients free of charge (Swiss Re, 2013b). The benefits of CatNet, as stated by
Swiss Re, include: “1) swift hazard checks for regions that are unfamiliar to clients; 2) access to
tailor made maps and satellite images; 3) the ability for clients to import location data to
illustrate risk exposures combined with natural hazard data; 4) country-specific insurance
conditions, claims experience, and natural disaster loss dimensions; and 5) recognition of
footprints of major catastrophes” (Swiss Re, n.d.).
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Other companies and partnerships offer information publicly or not for profit. In addition
to offering NATHAN to clients, Munich Re publically offers NatCatSERVICE, a database of
statistics on previous natural catastrophes, and Touch, an information portal that offers detailed
information and knowledge (Munich Re, 2011; n.d.). Another innovative example of data
sharing is the Oasis Loss Modeling Framework (Oasis), an open framework for catastrophe
modeling for developers. Oasis is a not-for-profit company owned by members who come from
the insurance and reinsurance community. It promotes a single format for different peril types
(e.g., wind, flood, earthquake, etc.) so that the risk information can be added together into a
single model. Oasis is currently only available to paying members, the price for which is
expected to drop when additional members join. Oasis acknowledges that insurers still must
carryout their validation exercises and document that the models are sufficient per standard
solvency regulation (World Risk and Insurance News, 2014). Nonetheless, this open format and
relatively cheaper model broadens the potential users to include policy makers and public
members, and creates an opportunity for faster data updating from the academic community and
other modelers.
Both client-privileged models and public models are valuable; the latter could have a
greater impact, though it is more challenging to fund and currently lacks the same level of data.
Availability of models and data should be increased to improve transparency of risk and
associated prices to facilitate greater understanding and motivate physical risk reduction.

Improve quality of data and risk analysis through collaboration with non-profits and government
In addition to making data and models more available, the insurance industry and
modelers should also improve their data and risk analysis. The insurance industry must evaluate
losses based on expected future weather and catastrophe patterns because past experience is
insufficient to predict future risk (Geneva Association, 2013b). Critics suggest the data to predict
future weather and catastrophe patterns is insufficient, that knowledge gaps exist, and that
prevailing underwriting practices do not reflect long-term projected risks (Economics of Climate
Adaptation Working Group, 2009; Urban Land Institute, 2013). In particular, the frequency and
severity of thunderstorms, hailstorms, and tornadoes need to be better understood (McHale &
Leurig, 2012). Updating data and risk analyses is important so that a company can understand
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and then price risk appropriately to reduce loss, but the financial investment for data is
significant and companies have limited capital and a desire to minimize underwriting costs.
A cost-effective recommendation to improve the quality of data and risk analysis is to
increase collaboration and data sharing between the private insurance industry and non-profit
climate-modeling scientists and organizations (McHale & Leurig, 2012; Mills, 2007). However,
contributing to a private company’s model for the purposes of financial gain may compromise
the tax-exempt status of an organization. Under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
an organization exempt from taxes must be “operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
educational, scientific” or other exempt purposes (Megosh, Scollich, Salins, & Chasin, 2001).
Information and data from a tax-exempt organization must be used in some way to advance their
charitable purposes and not primarily to enable a private party to use that information for private
gain (Chan, 2012). This reaffirms the recommendation to make models publically available for
the purposes of education, which may enable more non-profit partners to contribute additional
scientific data.
The not-for-profit Oasis Loss Modeling Framework, mentioned above, has the potential
to improve risk data and make it more available by providing a more open platform. Additional
non-profits not associated with the insurance industry are already seeking to improve data and
expand knowledge of risk. A new project called Risky Business seeks to assess the economic
risk the United Sates faces from the impacts of unmitigated climate change and plans to release a
report in June of 2014. The project is funding an independent risk assessment that combines
“existing data on the current and potential impacts of climate change with original research that
will quantify potential future costs” (Risky Business, n.d.). The second component of Risky
Business is an engagement effort to target the “economic sectors most at risk from a changing
climate, and begin the process of helping leaders from across these sectors prepare a measured
response” (Risk Business, n.d.). Though the level of detail and accessibility of the Risky
Business data is unclear from the media material, it may provide an additional opportunity for
partnership to improve models.
Finally, the insurance industry and members of the public should encourage governments
to contribute to data and risk analysis. Governments can stimulate the publically funded
academic sector to improve risk analyses and models and then make data freely available to risk
professionals (Geneva Association, 2013a). This combines resources for better data collection
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with a public venue to spread awareness broadly. The partnership between public programs and
private reinsurers may motivate this data investment, especially if it reduces premium prices to
the public program.
Ultimately, better data is essential to assess risk and encourage changed behavior.
Without it, parties will not be motivated to take action. The insurance industry should increase
partnerships with non-profits and the government to improve data.

Include green infrastructure resilience solutions in risk modeling
The industry recognizes the impact of different land use in terms of location and
practices, but should focus greater attention on the potential of green, or natural, infrastructure to
increase resilience. Green infrastructure relies on natural processes in addition to or in place of
gray infrastructure (including dikes, levees, and sea walls) to mitigate physical risk. Models
estimate the impact of gray infrastructure, but lack data on the impact of land use decisions and
natural infrastructure. To increase the accuracy of models and better understand risk, the positive
impact of existing and potential green infrastructure should be included (Dow Chemical, et al.,
2013).
One partnership is seeking to do just that. Swiss Re and other private and non-profit
partners produced a joint-industry white paper to explore the impact of planned and managed
natural and semi-natural systems to increase business resilience to external economic and
environmental stressor. One of the four key recommendations of the paper was for organizations
to change the economic and environmental footprint analysis so that benefits of green
infrastructure can be better recognized (Dow Chemical, Swiss Re, Shell, Unilever, & The Nature
Conservancy, 2013). The white paper did not confirm how the results would be integrated into
existing models or how the models would be shared.
More models should include the resilience benefits of green infrastructure. Including
these provides a more accurate prediction of risk, awareness of existing resilience, and will
inform appropriate additional mitigation efforts.
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3. Impact investments
The insurance industry is a major global investor and can invest in green bonds as a way
to mobilize “private capital to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation projects” (Reichelt,
2010). Green bonds are fixed income investments that provide capital for products with
environmental benefits (JPMorgan Chase, n.d.). The World Bank was the first entity to issue
green bonds in 2008, and has since issued over 5.6 million USD in green bonds (World Bank
Treasury, n.d.).
Green bonds are an example of impact investments, or investments designed to create
positive impacts as well as financial return (Saltuk, Bouri, Leung, 2011). The Global Impact
Investing Network, a nonprofit organization dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness
of impact investing, defines impact investing by the following four core characteristics:

•

“Intentionality: The intent of the investor to generate social and/or environmental
impact through investments is an essential component of impact investing.

•

Investment with return expectations: Impact investments are expected to generate a
financial return on capital and, at a minimum, a return of capital.

•

Range of return expectations and asset classes: Impact investments generate returns
that range from below market (sometimes called concessionary) to risk-adjusted market
rate

•

Impact measurement: A hallmark of impact investing is the commitment of the investor
to measure and report the social and environmental performance and progress of
underlying investments. Impact measurement helps ensure transparency and
accountability, and is essential to informing the practice of impact investing and building
the field” (Global Impact Investing Network, n.d.).
In November of 2013, Zurich Insurance Group committed to spending as much as 1

billion USD on green bonds, the largest investment in green bonds globally (Zurich, 2013). The
potential of green bonds and other impact investing is significant, but requires greater
transparency and disclosure absent official guidelines. Private financial institutions collaborated
to create Green Bond Principles, which outline voluntary process guidelines for issuing green
bonds, and are a step in the right direction (JPMorgan Chase, n.d.).
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The insurance industry should adjust their investment portfolio to include more green
bonds. The projects funded by green bonds can reduce risk through investment in more resilient
land uses or restored environments. Green bonds and impact investments highlight an important
way the industry can reduce physical risk as an investor and simultaneously increase profit. 	
  
	
  

4. Disaster risk reduction services
Insurance alone will fail to reduce risk unless it is implemented along with mitigation
measures (Warner, 2010). Providing mitigation solutions to reduce risk is essential to the
protection motivation theory to change behavior (Bubeck et al., 2012). Recall from Chapter 1
that the coping appraisal is the stage after an individual feels threatened, that involves thinking
about benefits of possible actions and evaluation of competencies to carry them out. It is critical
that an individual or corporation be aware of possible solutions to reduce the threat. This coping
appraisal, rather than the threat appraisal (i.e, risk perception) is a greater predictor or protective
response behavior (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Insurance providers can contribute to both
appraisal stages by raising awareness of risk and offering solutions through risk management
services.
The insurance industry already provides such services to clients, but faces two challenges
that limit the scale of impact. First, data availability and risk assessment information varies by
geography, especially in developing countries. Different locations may also present education
and language barriers that may lead to ineffective implementation (Warner et al., 2009). Second,
though the service already exists, the demand from consumers is relatively low (C. McHale,
personal communication, April 24, 2014). This may be in part due to a perception that
governments and not individuals and corporations are responsible for reducing rick.
The insurance industry should increase their risk management services to clients to offer
solutions and motivate risk resilient behavior. Insurance and reinsurance companies benefit from
these services by selling additional expertise and making high-risk areas more insurable. In order
to increase demand for disaster risk reduction services, the industry should educate consumers of
the benefit of taking such efforts or make reduction measures a prerequisite for insurance
coverage.
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Summary
These recommendations apply to the broad insurance industry, including both insurance
and reinsurance. Those interested in modifying the overall industry should consider the influence
of reinsurance companies specifically because they are an important lever to influence the
pricing and behavior of ceding insurers. Though the scale of the reinsurance sector itself is large,
it is actually dominated by relatively few major companies and geographies. The ten biggest
reinsurers account for two thirds of the market, with four of those ten accounting for nearly half
of the global market share in 2012 (Marketline, 2013; Swiss Re, 2013c). Given the potential of
self-regulation, changing behavior of these four companies may have an even greater effect. The
reinsurance sector is also regulated less than primary insurance companies, generally not beyond
the risk of defaults of insolvencies.
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CHAPTER 6: CHALLENGES
There are several challenges to the opportunities to influence additional proenvironmental behavior identified in Chapter 5. Recognition and resolution of each of these
challenges is essential for the industry to have a greater impact.

Risk premium prices may not change behavior of ceding companies or individual
policyholders
One assumption throughout this research is that the risk based premium prices will
reduce high-risk behavior by policyholders. However, policyholders may react to higher
premium prices by pursuing coverage from a different insurer, dropping coverage altogether, or
accepting the higher rate without changing behavior. The first reaction discourages industry
members to change their premiums to reflect the true cost and decreases the overall rate of
influence. The second reaction, to drop coverage altogether, puts the collective society at greater
risk and increases the likelihood of government intervention, described below. The third
reaction, to pay the higher rate without changing behavior, is a possible scenario that will vary by
individuals’ budgets. More research needs to be done to understand the financial threshold of
different socio-economic groups to incentivize action.

Government intervention may prevent risk based premiums
Governments can both promote and hinder the contributions of the insurance industry.
The public/private partnerships described in Chapter 5 identify positive opportunities to build
better models and change behavior through government incentives. However, government
intervention that interferes with risk based premiums prevents a healthy, private insurance
market (Ceres, 2010; Lloyds, 2011). Risk based premiums are essential to raise awareness and to
change behavior to reduce the magnitude of loss from risk. ClimateWise recognizes the
importance to accurately assess and price the risks associated with climate change and regards
such action as “critical to the development of climate resilience and adequately adapted lower
carbon economy” (2011).
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Unfortunately recent political decisions in the United States have shown disappointing
progress. President Obama signed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014
into law on March 21, 2014. This law repeals and modifies provisions of the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act, which encouraged risk based premium pricing for the Federal
Flood Insurance Program (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014a).

Competing risk transference or reducing products may create competition
Non-traditional insurance products, like CAT bonds and microinsurance, have the ability
to detract business from traditional reinsurance companies unless the industry incorporates them
into their portfolios. Companies should embrace these innovative new products and adjust
practices and expertise accordingly to offer it along with other traditional coverage. Doing so
requires additional upfront costs, but will keep them nimble enough to adjust to different
consumer demands. This may also provide an opportunity for non-traditional partnerships to
provide data in developing countries.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Increased risk from climate change is likely to impact every individual to some degree.
How we respond to reduce risk now will impact our future economies and societies. The
insurance industry is commonly regarded as the industry best able to reduce and spread financial
risk. Their business of reducing financial risk to policyholders has raised awareness, assigned an
economic value to risk, and resulted in climate change advocacy, as well as mitigation and
adaptation to reduce physical risk. The industry has proven to be a critical influencer to
encourage risk-adverse behavior and regulation, and will continue to do so; the recommendations
listed in Chapter 5 offer ways to broaden this influence.
However, the insurance industry alone cannot enact necessary change. The
recommendations to the industry emphasize the importance of collaboration with non-profits
organizations, governments, the scientific community, and industry peers. In order for such
collaborations to be successful, it is necessary to understand the motivations and limitations of
each party and explore shared priorities. Partnerships that encourage honest exchanges and
embrace a collaborative spirit are critical to address the potential global risks to come. Equally
important is recognizing the need for different communication messages and methods to share
risk information, offer solutions to reduce risk, and confirm incentives. While private businesses
may be motivated by protecting supply chains to ensure share prices, rural farmers may be more
interested in the ability to predict and adapt to varying rainfall to ensure their family’s continued
wellbeing. Each motivation is valid and should be addressed to enact risk-adverse behavior
change.
Collaboration requires a catalyst to unite partners. The party with the most to gain or the
most to lose often serves as catalyst; the insurance industry has and will likely continue to step
up to this role. As the ultimate accumulators of risk, the insurance industry may have much more
to lose as climate change progresses. Though it cannot singularly prevent risk from climate
change, the insurance industry is uniquely poised to significantly influence the world’s response.
Private and public entities should continue to partner with and encourage the industry to pursue
innovative solutions to reduce the financial and physical risk caused by climate change.
Ultimately, this will not eliminate risk, but it may avert the magnitude of impact from
catastrophes on our societies and economies.
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